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1 Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Feist Publn’s, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
2 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
3 Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 513.
4 Id. at 516 (finding there was not substantial similarity of protected expression).
5 The term “low authorship” work was applied by Professor Jane Ginsburg to fact works like
directories, maps, databases, and other compilations in contrast to works of “high authorship” like
novels and narrative histories.  Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:  Copyright Protection
for Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1866–71 (1990); see also Paul Heald, The Vices of
Originality, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 143, 150 (further applying the term). 
6 See CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETER JASZI & TYLER OCHOA, COPYRIGHT LAW 242
(7th ed. 2006) (“In the aftermath of Feist, the distinction between copyrightability, on the one hand,
and the scope of copyright protection, on the other, takes on special importance in compilation
cases.”).
7 Feist, 499 U.S. at 356–59.
8 See id. at 374 (noting that “a slight amount [of creativity] will suffice”) (citing 1 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][1] (2007 ed.)).
9 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see Alan Durham, Speaking of the World:  Fact, Opinion and the Originality
Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791, 793 (2001).
I.  INTRODUCTION
“While . . . the ‘copyright in a factual compilation is thin,’ we do not believe it
is anorexic.”1  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made this statement
shortly after the Supreme Court announced its landmark ruling in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co.2  The Second Circuit held that a yellow pages
directory of businesses in New York City’s Chinatown was copyrightable because
there was originality in the plaintiff’s selection of establishments to include in the
publication.3  The court concluded, however, that the defendant’s business guide
did not infringe because the organizing principles of the two publications were
different.4  This is a familiar scenario with litigation over “low authorship” works5
like directories.  The plaintiff won the battle over copyrightability but lost the war
of infringement.  The scope of the plaintiff’s copyright might not have been
anorexic, but it was certainly lean. 
Questions about the copyrightability of compilations and other low authorship
fact works, and about the scope of protection, have continued to trouble courts
long after Feist.6  The Supreme Court’s focus was on the protectability of a
telephone company’s standard white pages directory7 that had been copied by the
publisher of an area-wide directory.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion, explaining why
the directory did not meet the constitutional and statutory requirements for
copyright protection, defined an original work of authorship as one that is
independently created by its author and that evidences at least a minimal level of
creativity.8  Most works will satisfy this standard since they will possess some
creative spark.9 
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10 Feist, 499 U.S. at 358–59.
11 See Durham, supra note 9, at 793–94;  Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 801, 803–04 (1993); Diane Zimmerman, It’s an Original!(?):  In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive
Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 188 (2005).
12 See Howard Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, LAW & CONTEM. PROBS., Spring
1992, at 16.  Cf. VerSteeg, supra note 11, at 822 (noting that the Court failed to explain how it
determined that the white pages lacked the requisite creativity).
13 See Durham, supra note 9, at 801 (defining and explaining merger).
14 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).  But see Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law (Minn.
Legal Studies Research Paper 07-34, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999433
(forthcoming in UTAH LAW REVIEW) (criticizing copyright’s treatment of methods, systems, and
processes in several post-Feist decisions dealing with the protectability of valuation estimates).
15 See, e.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 928–30 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding plaintiff’s tables to be copyrightable because they were configured in an optional way and
were the product of format choices that were not unavoidable and for which there were an immense
number of alternate combinations defendant could have used instead of slavishly copying plaintiff’s
tables); see also Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606–07 (1st Cir.
1988); Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1985);
Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D. Mass.
1995); infra notes 321–34 and accompanying text.
Even though the task of opining on the question of copyrightability should not
be onerous because the originality standard is not stringent10 the modicum of
creativity requirement is seen as being elusive.11  For the most part, the Supreme
Court defined creativity in Feist by negative example, describing how an author’s
efforts in preparing a compilation might not satisfy the requirement:  selections
and arrangements that are mechanical, routine, commonplace, typical, garden
variety, obvious, inevitable, or dictated by law will fail to pass muster.12  Reported
decisions applying Feist to challenged compilations and other low authorship
works now provide many examples of unprotectable works deemed to be
commonplace, routine, or garden-variety.  The courts have added to the Supreme
Court’s examples of what is not creative by considering the impact of industry
standards, customary practices, and regulatory requirements.  The post-Feist cases
also show that the merger doctrine is a significant hurdle for compilers13 as is the
idea/expression dichotomy’s ban on extending copyright protection to ideas,
methods of operation, systems, and concepts as codified in section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act.14
Once a compilation is held copyrightable, the court has to rule on whether the
work has been infringed.  This requires dissection of the work to distinguish
protected expression from unprotected facts and ideas.  This is easier said than
done because of the creativity requirement.  Here again, the many decisions
applying Feist in determining whether a thinly protected low authorship work has
been infringed show that winning the infringement war is difficult absent proof
of something close to wholesale copying.15  This is because it is challenging to
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16 See, e.g., Consumers Union v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983); Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Camp System, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (S.D. Ga. 2006).
17 Cf. Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 211–12 (“The discipline imposed by a system of precedent
[and appellate review] will ultimately lead to some reasonable agreement about what kinds of works
do and do not exhibit sufficient creativity to warrant protection. . . .”).
18 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 46 (1967).
19 See Feist Publn’s, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–54 (1991) (discussing the
“sweat of the brow” or “industrious collection” theory of copyright protection).
20 Id. at 344.
21 Id. at 363.
22 Id. at 342–44.
identify protected expression in a compilation and then to show that the defendant
copied a substantial amount of that expression.  In addition, the fair use defense
can be applied to excuse some appropriations of protected expression.16 
This Article, with the help of many post-Feist opinions,17 elaborates on Justice
O’Connor’s guidance for determining whether a compilation or other low
authorship work is entitled to copyright protection and, if so, whether the work
has been infringed.  It was observed forty years ago that “to make the copyright
turnstile revolve, the author should have to deposit more than a penny in the box,
and some like measure ought to apply to infringement.”18  This Article explains
how much more than a penny is needed to get through that turnstile and
concludes that the courts have been relatively consistent in applying the
fundamental principles of Feist in a variety of contexts and thereby ensuring that
copyright does not improperly extend to facts, ideas, systems, and concepts.
Traditional case-by-case application of Feist’s principles is working well and the
“sweat of the brow” rationale19 for protection has not been resurrected. 
II.  THE FUNDAMENTALS OF Feist
The facts of Feist were simple.  Rural Telephone published a standard white
pages directory with subscribers’ names and numbers listed in alphabetical order,
and there was no doubt that Feist, a competing publisher of phone books, copied
roughly 1,300 of Rural’s names and numbers.20  The trial court found infringement
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed.21  It held that
Rural’s copyright did not protect the names and numbers copied by Feist, and it
declared that originality—independent creation and a modest degree of
creativity—is a constitutional requirement for copyright.22
Since this Article discusses the challenge of applying Feist’s principles to close
questions on originality and the scope of protection, it is important to state the
principles that emerged from ruling on those simple facts.  The starting point is
the Supreme Court’s statement that “facts are not copyrightable” yet
2007] THIN BUT NOT ANOREXIC 95
23 Id. at 345.  See generally Abrams, supra note 12, at 9–14.  Facts are discoverable; they are not
created.  Durham, supra note 9, at 794–95.
24 “ ‘[A] modicum of intellectual labor . . . clearly constitutes an essential constitutional
element.’ ”  Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.08[C][1]).
25 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
26 Id. at 345–46.  But see CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] S.C.R. 339
¶¶ 21–22, 24 (the Canadian Supreme Court misread Feist’s originality/modicum of creativity
standard as requiring a work to be novel or unique in order to be protected by copyright).
27 Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.  A compilation is “a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
28 Feist, 499 U.S. at 352–54.
29 Id. at 357–58.
30 Id. at 359; see also Heald, supra note 5, at 145–49; Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 187–88.  Many
of the post-Feist decisions dealing with the copyrightability of compilations assess the creativity
involved in selecting and arranging information.  See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co.,
158 F.3d 674, 681 (2d Cir. 1998).
31 Abrams, supra note 12, at 14.
“compilations of facts generally are.”23  The tension between these fundamental
propositions is explained by the concept of originality, the sine qua non of
copyright.  An original work is one that is independently created by its author and
that possesses at least a minimal level of creativity.  The requisite level of creativity
is low,24 and most works will satisfy this standard since they will possess some
creative spark.25  It does not matter that a work is crude or humble or obvious.
Novelty is not required.26 
Assuming independent work by the author, the requisite creativity for fact
works like compilations may come from the author’s choice of facts, the order in
which those facts are placed, or how the data is arranged.27  However, it is not
enough for an author to labor hard at the selection or arrangement of facts.  Sweat
and elbow grease alone do not satisfy Feist’s requirements.28  Facts must be
selected, coordinated or arranged so that the resulting work as a whole is
copyrightable.29  The vast majority of compilations and other fact works will cross
the originality threshold but not all because there remains a category of works
where the creative spark is lacking or so trivial as to be nonexistent.30  The
Supreme Court was emphatic that the requirement of originality, including the
creativity component, is imposed by the Constitution.31
Feist’s requirements that a work must be independently created and possess
some minimal level of creativity in order to be entitled to copyright protection is
consistent with the requirements of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) and the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).  Both use the term
“intellectual creation” as a requirement for a compilation or collective work to
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32 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Article Works, art. 2(5), July 24,
1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 10(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
33 Daniel Gervais, Feist Goes Global:  A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright
Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 971 n.150 (2002).
34 See DANIEL CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PROBLEMS, CASES & MATERIALS 144–45 (2006).
35 Gervais, supra note 33, at 961 (cited with approval in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of
Upper Can., [2004] S.C.R. 13, 24).
36 CHOW & LEE, supra note 34, at 145 (citing PAUL GELLER & MELVILLE NIMMER,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE § 2[1][b][iii] (France) (2004 )).
37 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
38 Id. at 58–60; see also VerSteeg, supra note 11, at 836–37; Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 188.
39 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
40 Id.
41 Id. (citing William Patry, Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the “White Pages” are not
Copyrightable), COMM. & L., Dec. 1990, at 64).
42 Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50 (discussing Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985)).
receive protection as a literary or artistic work,32 and it is recognized that this term
applies generally to all works.33  Works lacking intellectual creation may not receive
copyright protection consistent with the requirements of Berne and TRIPs.34  The
requirement demands more than a work that simply originates from the author
and it includes, if not creativity as such, then at least some intellectual effort.35
Similarly, the French requirement that a work reflect the author’s personality
through creative choices in order to be protected by copyright is satisfied when an
author shows the exercise of some creative choice and not slavish copying.36
These requirements of intellectual effort or intellectual creation echo the Supreme
Court’s discussion of originality in the 1884 classic, Burrow-Giles Lithographic v.
Sarony,37 in which the Court used terms like thought, intellectual production,
intellectual conception, and intellectual creation in explaining why Sarony’s famous
photograph of Oscar Wilde was copyrightable.38
The originality, intellectual creation, and creative choices standards are low
thresholds for copyright protection, so it is inevitable that the scope of protection
for fact works is thin,39 extending only to those aspects that are original to the
author.40  Determining this is challenging, but if the author’s selection and
arrangement of facts are original, then those aspects of the work are protected, but
not the facts themselves.41  A subsequent author or compiler can freely use those
facts so long as his or her presentation of them does not have the same selection
or arrangement.42 
In applying these principles to Rural’s white pages the Supreme Court re-
emphasized that “originality is not a stringent standard,’ ” but added “that the
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43 Id. at 362.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 362–63.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 363.
48 Id.  The selection of facts for the directory and their presentation were evaluated separately
by the Court.  See Abrams, supra note 12, at 18.
49 Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
50 Id. at 363–64 (“As a statutory matter, 17 U.S.C. § 101 does not afford protection from
copying to a collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks
originality.”).
51 Id. at 364 (“Because Rural’s white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist’s use of listings
cannot constitute infringement.”).
52 Id. at 348.
selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to
require no creativity whatsoever.”43  Rural’s directory did not satisfy this low
standard because it was a typical, “garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of
even the slightest trace of creativity.”44 The selection of listings was obvious and,
notwithstanding Rural’s efforts, lacking the modicum of creativity required to
transform mere selection into copyrightable expression.45  Moreover, since Rural
was required by the Kansas Corporation Commission to publish the names and
telephone numbers of its subscribers, it was reasonable to conclude that the
plaintiff’s selection was dictated by state law and not creative.46
Similarly, the Court found that Rural’s coordination and arrangement of its
subscribers’ information in alphabetical order lacked originality.47  There is nothing
remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically.  This is a time-honored,
age-old practice rooted in tradition that is commonplace and universal.  It is
unoriginal and practically inevitable.48  Thus, the Court determined it was obvious
that Rural’s white pages did not meet the originality requirement:  “Given that
some works must fail, we cannot imagine a more likely candidate.  Indeed, were
we to hold that Rural’s white pages pass muster, it is hard to believe that any
collection of facts could fail.”49  Accordingly, since the names, towns and numbers
in Rural’s directory were not protected by copyright, Feist’s use of them did not
infringe.50
The Court did not have to address the issue of substantial similarity of
protected expression directly because Feist reproduced unprotected facts that were
presented as an alphabetical listing that lacked the requisite modicum of
creativity.51  It did, however, make several important statements that weigh heavily
in proving infringement, noting for example that “even a directory that contains
absolutely no protectible written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional
minimum for copyright protection if it features an original selection or
arrangement,”52 but then adding that this protection is limited:  “The mere fact
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53 Id.
54 Id. at 359 (citing and quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 55
(1975)). 
55 Id.
56 See Abrams, supra note 12, at 33; Durham, supra note 9, at 793 (stating that creativity is the
missing term in the Feist equation); VerSteeg, supra note 11, at 823 (the Court defined creativity by
default); Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 188 (saying that the Court offered no real answer about what
was the minimum necessary to satisfy the demand for creativity).  The opinion does not make clear
whether originality is to be found by looking at the work or by evaluating the mental processes that
went into producing it.  Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331,
334–35 (1992).  The many low authorship cases decided since Feist show that courts consider both
the work itself and the nature of the author’s intellectual labor. 
that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be
protected.  Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright
protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the
author.”53
The Court repeated this, emphasizing that even if a compilation is
copyrightable, it receives only limited protection.
As § 103 makes clear, copyright is not a tool by which a compilation
author may keep others from using the facts or data he or she has
collected.  “The most important point here is one that is commonly
misunderstood today:  copyright . . . has no effect one way or the
other on the copyright or public domain status of the preexisting
material.”54
Thus, according to the Court, facts “may be freely copied because copyright
protects only the elements that owe their origin to the compiler—the selection,
coordination, and arrangement of facts.”55
III.  APPLICATIONS OF Feist’s FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court defined creativity negatively by
describing how a compiler’s work might fail to satisfy the requirement; selections
and arrangements that are mechanical, routine, common place, typical, garden
variety, obvious, inevitable, time-honored, age-old, or dictated by law will fail to
pass muster.56  Moreover, the author claiming infringement must prove creativity,
defined as “the existence of . . . intellectual production, of thought and
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57 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (citing and quoting Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 59–60 (1883)).  There must be some exercise of judgment by the author in his or her
selection, coordination, or arrangement of the facts.  See Abrams, supra note 12, at 17. 
58 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362; see also Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 208–09.
59 Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
60 Blank forms that are designed to record information rather than to convey it are generally not
copyrightable.  1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.18[B][4].
61 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also Heald, supra note 5, at 160–68 (criticizing Feist and predicting
accurately that it would cause problems for works like law reports, yellow pages, maps, new uses of
existing data, live broadcasts, and computer programs).
62 See infra notes 321–34 and accompanying text.
63 Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
64 See infra notes 309–10 and accompanying text.
65 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 352–54 (defining and discussing the discredited “sweat of the brow” basis
for protection).
66 See supra Part II.
67 See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
conception.”57  Novelty need not be shown nor does the work have to be
innovative or surprising,58 but effort alone is not enough.59
The many decisions applying Feist to low authorship works have added to the
Supreme Court’s descriptions of what might not be creative by considering the
impact of industry standards, customary practices, and regulatory requirements.
The blank form doctrine is a limitation on protection,60 and the merger doctrine
is another significant hurdle for compilers, as is the ban on extending copyright
protection to ideas, methods of operation, systems, and concepts in section 102(b)
of the Copyright Act.61
Notwithstanding the creativity requirement, originality remains a low threshold
consistent with the Supreme Court’s statements in Feist.  However, even if a work
is copyrightable, the decisions also show, consistent with Feist’s principles, that
proving substantial similarity of expression is difficult.62  This is because
protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the
author.63  The courts are making sure that copyright is not a tool by which a
compiler or other low authorship work writer may keep others from using the
facts or data he or she has collected.64  Sweat of the brow has not been given new
life.65
A. DIRECTORIES
There is no doubt after Feist that a standard white pages telephone directory,
with the subscribers’ information arranged in alphabetical order, is not
copyrightable.66  There is no creativity in either the selection of the names and
numbers or in that standard arrangement.67  What about the yellow pages?  There
would seem to be a considerable amount of creativity involved in selecting and
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68 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 73–74 (4th ed. 2005).
69 Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1991).
The yellow pages accounted for roughly two-thirds of Key’s directory.  Initially, the work included
businesses in just Chinatown, but then it was expanded to include businesses in other parts of
metropolitan New York as well as Boston and Philadelphia.  See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 262;
Durham, supra note 9, at 812–13.
70 Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 511–12, 514.
71 Id. at 513.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 512–13.
74 See Matthew Bender & Co. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d at 682 (2d Cir. 1998).
75 Key Publ’ns, 945 F.2d at 514.
76 Id. at 513–14.
presenting the materials that make up the yellow pages.68  What about other
directories?  The answer is that most will pass muster and be protectable, but that
does not mean much because the protection will be very thin and infringed only
by wholesale reproduction.
The Second Circuit held in Key Publications that the plaintiff’s classified business
directory for New York City’s Chinese-American community was copyrightable.69
The 9,000 businesses the plaintiff selected for the work were sorted by type of
business, each listing was put in one of 260 descriptive categories like Accountants
and Art Supplies, and each listing had the English and Chinese names of the
establishment along with its address and telephone number.70  The court explained
that selection implies the exercise of judgment in choosing what to include, and
the plaintiff chose from among a multitude of establishments those businesses
that, in her opinion, would be of the greatest interest to her audience.71  The
compiler deliberately chose to exclude businesses that she believed would not
remain open, such as some insurance brokers, takeout restaurants, and traditional
Chinese medical practitioners.72  The appellate court felt this degree of selectivity,
or this rationale for selection, adequately supported the trial court’s conclusion
that there was originality and creativity in selection;73 another way to say this is that
creativity inheres in the making of non-obvious selections from more than a few
options.74
The court also said that although Key’s arrangement was typical of most
directories with listings in standard categories like accountants, bridal shops, and
shoe stores, all arranged in alphabetical order, it also included categories of special
interest to the Chinese-American community like “Bean Curd & Bean Sprout
Shops.”75  The court concluded that this arrangement was not mechanical.
Instead, it showed creativity and was thus copyrightable.76  It was not typical,
garden-variety, routine, or obvious.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court held that Key’s directory was not
infringed.  The Court noted that the substantial similarity inquiry is narrowed with
2007] THIN BUT NOT ANOREXIC 101
77 Id. at 514–15.
78 Id. at 515.
79 Id. at 515–16.
80 Id. at 514–16.  The defendant did not duplicate Key’s categories or more than just a few
entries.  For example, Key listed 124 accountants while defendant’s directory had forty-two.  Id.
at 515.  See also Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 677
(D. Mass. 1995) (stating that while summary judgment is not appropriate in litigation over
competing legal directories because reasonable people might differ on whether the compilations as
a whole were substantially similar, the constituent elements of plaintiff’s directory were not
protectable because of the merger doctrine, the blank form doctrine, common property, and core
similarities and differences); O.P. Solutions, Inc. v. Intellectual Prop. Network, Ltd., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1818 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (compilation of components in a computer program’s screen
display/user interface held copyrightable and infringed by defendant’s substantially similar selection
and arrangement).
81 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).  This litigation started in the 1980s before Feist was decided.
Initially, the trial court granted summary judgment to BellSouth on its infringement claim.  BellSouth
Adver. & Publ’g Co. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g, 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988).  This judgment
was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit but subsequently vacated by a grant of rehearing en banc.
BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Co. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g, 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated and
en banc reh’g granted, BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Co. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g, 977 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir.
1992); see also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 243.  The first Eleventh Circuit decision, finding the
yellow pages copyrightable and infringed, is discussed and criticized in Abrams, supra note 12, at
24–28.  He argues that the court was wrong for not asking whether the classification scheme was
original to the plaintiff and whether the categories were typical or garden-variety.  He also says that
much of the vacated opinion was inconsistent with Feist.  Id.
82 BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1438.
83 Id. at 1438, 1445.
compilations because their components are generally in the public domain, and
even absolute identity as to matters in the public domain does not establish
infringement absent copying of the protected elements of the compilation:  Key’s
selection and arrangement.77  Here there was not substantial similarity because the
defendant had only twenty-eight categories compared to Key’s 260, and only three
of the categories overlapped; just 17% of Key’s listings were included in the
defendant’s guide, and at least 25% of the defendant’s entries were not in Key’s
directory.78  The court concluded as a matter of law that there was no
infringement.79  To rule otherwise would have afforded protection to facts and
bring back the discredited “sweat of the brow” rationale for protection of
compilations.80
A standard yellow pages directory was at issue in BellSouth Advertising &
Publishing Co. v. Donnelley Information Publishing.81  The parties stipulated that
BellSouth’s directory, considered as whole, qualified for copyright protection.82
The defendant had not copied the text or graphics of BellSouth’s ads; it had not
used BellSouth’s typeface, and it had not photocopied or reproduced the page-by-
page arrangements or appearance of the directory.83  The pivotal issue was
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84 Id. at 1438.  See generally Durham, supra note 9, at 813–14 (discussing the court’s reasoning as
to the originality of the directory).
85 BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1441.
86 Id.
87 Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
88 Id. at 1442.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967) (“When the
uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the topic necessarily requires, . . . if not only
one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a
party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all future use of the
substance.”).  Even if there are a myriad of ways to express the idea of a particular function or
whether the defendant had copied any protected expression,84 and this required
the court to explain what was copyrightable in the yellow pages.  Given the court’s
rigorous application of Feist, it might have been more accurate for the Eleventh
Circuit to reject that stipulation of copyrightability and state that hardly anything
in a standard yellow pages directory is protectable. 
The court first held that the company’s acts of selection in deciding what to
include, such as determining the directory’s geographic scope, setting the closing
date after which changes could not be made, and its marketing techniques to
generate the data, did not meet the required level of originality.85  These were
techniques for the discovery of facts, not acts of authorship.86 The court stated:
Any useful collection of facts, however, will be structured by a
number of decisions regarding the optimal manner in which to
collect the pertinent data in the most efficient and accurate manner.
If this were sufficient, then the protection of copyright would
extend to census data, cited in Feist as a paradigmatic example of a
work that lacks the requisite originality.87
The court then ruled that BellSouth’s coordination and arrangement of the
yellow pages was not copyrightable.88  It acknowledged that the yellow pages
required “somewhat more organization and arrangement than the white pages,”
but this was not enough because BellSouth “did not deviate from the arrangement
of the typical business directory which employs an alphabetical list of headings to
describe the various types of businesses and then alphabetizes the listings under
the appropriate headings.”89  Moreover, although there might have been other
ways to arrange the directory, BellSouth’s claim of copyright in the arrangement
also failed because of “merger.”90  This doctrine has the effect of preventing
copyright protection for original expression when there are only a few ways to
express the underlying idea.91  It was irrelevant whether there might have been
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concept, expression merges with the underlying function, concept, or idea if efficiency concerns
narrow the range of choices to but a few workable options.  See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992).
92 BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1442–43.
93 Id.; see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g, 158 F.3d 674, 682 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting
no creativity demonstrated when industry standard strongly influences categories).
94 BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1444.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1442.
97 Id. at 1442, 1444–45; Durham, supra note 9, at 813.
98 BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1445 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment for BellSouth and entered judgment for Donnelly.  Id. at
1446.
99 Id. at 1438; see Transwestern Publ’g Co. v. Multimedia Mkts. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773,
776–77 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding judgment as a matter of law for defendant alleged to have
infringed plaintiff’s telephone directory containing both white and yellow pages); Skinder-Strauss
Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 673–77 (D. Mass. 1995)
(constituent elements of plaintiff’s legal directory did not warrant protection because of the blank
form doctrine, merger, and common property such as lists of judges and lawyers).
“some imaginable, although manifestly less useable method of arranging business
telephone listings” because the pertinent inquiry was whether BellSouth
demonstrated originality in its arrangement.92  It had not because the arrangement
was typical, following widely used industry standards.93  In essence, although the
contents of the yellow pages vary from community to community, the basic
arrangement stays the same.  My familiarity with using the yellow pages in Atlanta
will serve me well when I use the yellow pages in Chicago.
The court also concluded that BellSouth’s heading structure did not merit
protection because many of the selected headings, like “Attorneys” and “Banks,”
were obvious.94  In addition, protection could not be claimed in ideas like dividing
churches by denomination or attorneys by area of specialty, and many of the
headings resulted from standard industry practices including recommendations of
the National Yellow Pages Sales Association.95  Furthermore, the court noted that
subscribers select the heading under which their information appears from several
alternatives, so much of BellSouth’s heading structure was not original because it
owed its origin to others.96  Accordingly, the high degree of similarity between
BellSouth’s and the defendant’s directories was due to the use of common facts,
common unprotected arrangements, and the similar coordination of the
directories into alphabetized listings under practical and inevitable unprotected
classifications.97  The court concluded that Donnelly “did not . . . appropriate
whatever original elements might arguably inhere in the” BellSouth directory.98  The
court accepted that the directory as a whole might be copyrightable, but it appears
that this protection extended only to prevent wholesale reproduction.99 
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100 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997); see also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 243; Durham, supra
note 9, at 815–16.
101 Warren Publ’g, 115 F.3d at 1511–12.  The sections, ‘Directory of Cable Systems’ and ‘Group
Ownership of Cable Systems in the United States,’ comprised 1,340 pages of data on 8,413 cable
systems in the nation.  Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1516.
105 Id. at 1516 n.18. 
106 Id. at 1512.
107 Id.  The court used the Georgia section of the book as an example.  In that section, Atlanta
was designated as a principal community for a particular operator, and then other cities in north
central Georgia served by that operator, such as Alpharetta, Avondale Estates, Clarkston and so on,
were cross referenced.  Id. at 1512 n.3.
 The Eleventh Circuit’s rigorous application of Feist to a directory also is seen
in Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.100  Sections of the massive Television
& Cable Factbook, in particular Warren’s principal and lead community system,
were allegedly infringed by Microdos Data’s Cable Access software package.101  The
lower court granted summary judgment for Warren, ruling that its principal
community system was copyrightable.102  The Eleventh Circuit, however, vacated
and remanded, disagreeing on copyrightability while elaborating on what does not
satisfy the originality standard.103
The defendant did not contest that plaintiff’s Factbook, considered as a whole,
is entitled to copyright protection as a compilation.104  Instead, it challenged the
trial court’s finding that Warren’s system for selecting principal communities was
protectable.105  The directory of cable systems section contained a huge amount
of information including the name, address, and telephone number of each cable
system operator, the number of subscribers, the channels offered, the price of
service, and the type of equipment.106  These entries were arranged by state in
alphabetical order, and within each state all the communities receiving cable
service were listed alphabetically.  However, the factual information for each
system was not printed under the name of every community served by that cable
operator because many communities were part of multi-community systems, and
repeating all of the data under every community would have been duplicative and
added to the bulk of the publication.  Instead, one community was determined to
be the lead or principal community served by a particular cable company, and all
of the data about that cable system was listed under that community. There were
cross-references to that principal community under the entries for the other cities
and towns served by that cable operator.107  The district court said that this system
for the selection of communities was original in the industry and a copyrightable
part of the compilation’s format:  “ ‘[T]he selection of those communities was
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108 Id. at 1516 (quoting district court ruling).
109 Id. at 1517.  The trial court found a greater than 90% correlation between the principal
communities in the Illinois section of Warren’s book and the Illinois section of defendant’s cable
access software.  According to the trial court, this evidenced substantial similarity of protected
expression.  Id. at 1516 n.20. 
110 Id. at 1517 (citing and quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)).
111 Id. at 1518 (citing, discussing, and quoting Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters.
Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1991)).
112 Id. (emphasis added); see also Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 86 (2d
Cir. 2004) (remanding so the trial court could decide whether compilation of all the uncollected
poems of the late Dorothy Parker was sufficiently creative).
113 Warren Publ’g, 115 F.3d at 1518–19, 1519 n.27. 
creative and protectable because Warren uses a unique system in selecting the
communities that will be represented in the Factbook.’ ”108
The Eleventh Circuit held that it was error to conclude that the selection
system was copyrightable so it did not matter whether the defendant used it.109
The court relied on section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which excludes
protection for ideas, procedures, processes, and systems regardless of the way they
are described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in a work, and stated that “[i]f
Warren actually does employ a system to select the communities to be represented
in the book, then section 102(b) . . . bars the protection of such a system.”110
The court did not, however, stop there.  It went on to say that even if Warren’s
selection of communities could not be called a system, the company’s decisions
about which communities to include still would not be a copyrightable selection.
There was nothing showing that Warren exercised any creativity or judgment in
determining which cable systems to include.111  Instead, Warren
included the entire relevant universe known to it.  The only decision that it
made was that it would not list separately information for each
community that was part of a multi-community cable system; in
other words, it decided to make the Factbook commercially useful.
Therefore, it cannot prevail in its claim that it “selected” which
communities to include in the Factbook.112
The court also explained that the idea of organizing by principal community
yielded but a few ways of expressing the data and concluded that the organization
of the cable system data merged with the underlying idea of cross-referencing.
According to the court, the “people for whom [the directory is] produced are not
interested” in alternate methods of presentation.113  Adding insult to injury, the
court also stated that even if the selection of the principal communities was creative
and thus copyrightable, Warren’s claim for protection still failed because it did not
make the actual selections.  The record showed that the cable operators
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114 Id. at 1519–20.  The court noted similarities to how BellSouth relied on its subscribers in
setting up the yellow pages.
115 Id.  Three members of the court joined in a vigorous dissent, arguing that Warren’s
compilation of data on cable television, in the form of data reporting units with each unit named
for a principal community, was original and creative.  Id. at 1521–31 (Godbold, J., dissenting); see
Durham, supra note 9, at 816–17.
116 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120 Cf. Durham, supra note 9, at 817 (explaining that Warren is a difficult case because there is a
strong argument that creative choices were made, and saying that perhaps the result is best
understood as turning on the fact that the organizing principle for the directory was an
unprotectable idea).
determined, in the case of a multi-community system, the city or town under
which the factual data for the entire system was to be listed.114
Warren developed an efficient method for gathering and organizing
information, but that method could not be protected for several reasons:115  the
system was arguably unprotectable under section 102(b);116 even if it was not a
system there was insufficient evidence of creativity in selection because all
communities with cable systems were listed;117 the information merged with the
idea of cross-referencing,118 and, it was the cable operators themselves who
selected their principal community.119  As in BellSouth, it meant little to say that
Warren’s directory was a copyrightable compilation.  It would have been difficult
to find infringement absent wholesale, verbatim reproduction of almost the entire
work because there was no creative selection; the organizational system was
unprotectable as was the idea of cross-referencing to a principal community, and
what judgment might have been involved in picking a principal community was
not exercised by Warren.  It is as if this directory was doomed from the start.120
In summary, most directories will be copyrightable as compilations when
considered as a whole.  However, due to Feist’s principles, this copyright
protection will be very thin, only protecting the compiler against wholesale
reproduction.  It is a “so what” copyright.
B. CATALOGUE NUMBERS FOR PARTS
There was copyright litigation over catalogue numbers and numbering systems
prior to Feist, and these disputes have continued.  The typical scenario involves a
manufacturer or distributor of replacement parts for consumer products copying
the original manufacturer’s parts numbers, its numbering system, or both so it can
compete effectively against the original manufacturer in the market for
replacement parts.  The original manufacturer does not like this competition, so
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121 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 83 (“Decisions about rights in catalogue numbers for
replacement parts demonstrate the tendency of courts to discount and authorship showing minimal
creativity.”).
122 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986).  See generally VerSteeg, supra note 11, at 867–73
(discussing the Toro decision and possible arguments for upholding copyright on the parts numbers).
123 Toro, 787 F.2d at 1210.  R & R made and sold only those replacement parts that were in high
demand because they wear out.  Original manufacturers, like Toro, have to offer a full line of parts,
which results in overhead costs that are reflected in higher prices—R & R’s prices were
generally 10% to 25% below Toro’s.  Id.
124 Id. at 1211.
125 Id. at 1212–13.
126 Id. (quoting from the testimony of Toro’s vice president for distribution).
it sues, alleging that the replacement parts maker has infringed the copyright on
its numbers and numbering system.  These claims have not fared well.121
Several years before Feist, the Eighth Circuit held in Toro Co. v. R & R Products
Co. that Toro’s parts numbering system for its lawn care products was not
copyrightable because it was arbitrary and random.122  There was no doubt that
defendant R & R, a maker of replacement parts for several brands of lawn care
equipment, was using Toro’s five or six digit numbers in its parts catalog.  It
simply preceded them with the letter R.123  The trial court ruled for R & R because
it found that Toro’s numbers were unprotectable under section 102(b) as a
system.124  The Eighth Circuit disagreed, saying that although the general idea of
using numbers to designate replacement parts could not be protected under
section 102(b), there were many different ways to express numbering systems.  It
also said that the merger doctrine did not preclude protection.125  Still, Toro’s
numbering system did not meet the low originality threshold in large part because
of testimony that “once a part is created ‘an arbitrary number is assigned’ to the
part to identify it.”126  The court stated:
There was no evidence that a particular series or configuration of
numbers denoted a certain type or category of parts or that the
numbers used encoded any kind of information at all.  In short,
numbers were assigned to a part without rhyme or reason.  This
record establishes that the appellant’s parts numbering “system”
falls short of even the low threshold of originality.  The random and
arbitrary use of numbers in the public domain does not evince
enough originality to distinguish authorship.  The expression itself
is nothing more than the public domain numbers.  There is no
variation, other than the trivial hyphen, to establish authorship.
Also, it is clear that no effort or judgment went into the selection or
composition of the numbers, which distinguishes this case from the
telephone directory cases.  We are left, then, with the accidental
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127 Id. at 1213.
128 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted), cited in Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213.  The
“sweat of the brow” basis for protection was alive and well in the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth
Circuits prior to Feist.  JOYCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 241–42.
129 Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213.
130 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).  In the Southco litigation, the trial court initially granted a
preliminary injunction against a competitor’s use of Southco’s parts numbers to identify and
distinguish types of fasteners, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.  Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp. (Southco I), 258 F.3d. 148, 149 (3d Cir. 2001).  On remand, the trial court granted
summary judgment for the competitor, Southco appealed, and the appeals court reversed, and a
rehearing en banc was granted.  Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco II), 324 F.3d 190, 197
(3d Cir. 2003).  The full Court of Appeals then affirmed the summary judgment for the competitor.
Southco III, 390 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2004).
131 402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005).
132 See CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETER JASZI & TYLER OCHOA, COPYRIGHT LAW 98
(6th ed. 2003) (“Is this a no-win situation for part numbers?”).
133 Southco III, 390 F.3d at 278.
marriage of a part and a number.  We do not believe that such a
marriage produces an original work of authorship.127
This result must have been a surprise to Toro because only a year earlier the
Eighth Circuit held in Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. that a
telephone company’s white pages directory was original and copyrightable because
the “author had ‘solicited, gathered, filed, sorted, and maintained the information
used in the directory,’ ” and “the directory was ‘derived from information
compiled and generated’ by the author’s efforts.”128  Toro’s admission that the
numbers were assigned arbitrarily doomed its infringement claim.  Moreover, the
Eighth Circuit did not say that numbering systems were per se uncopyrightable.
To the contrary, it stated that “[a] system that uses symbols in some sort of
meaningful pattern, something by which one could distinguish effort or content,
would be an original work.”129 
The Eighth Circuit’s statements about the potential copyrightability of
numbering systems were made five years before the Supreme Court announced
its decision in Feist.  In addition, the court ignored the prohibition on extending
copyright protection to systems in section 102(b).  Based on the Third Circuit’s
post-Feist decision in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco III)130 and the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in ATC Distribution Group v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions &
Parts, Inc.,131 the Eighth Circuit’s statements were wrong.132
Southco manufactured a variety of screw fasteners used in assembling the
panels of items like computers and telecommunications equipment.  The fasteners
came in different thread sizes, finishes, diameters, lengths, and compositions.133
In order to help employees and costumers identify and distinguish among these
fasteners, Southco developed a numbering system to serve as a shorthand
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134 Id.
135 Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213.
136 For example, in part number 47-10-202-10, each group of numbers represented a functional
characteristic of the product.  Southco I, 258 F.3d at 149–50.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 149–50; see also Southco III, 390 F.3d at 279; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 83.
139 Southco I, 258 F.3d at 152.
140 Southco III, 390 F.3d at 282. 
141 Southco I, 258 F.3d at 150, 153; see also Southco III, 390 F.3d at 283.
142 Southco III, 390 F.3d at 282.
143 Id. at 285.  The court noted that if any creativity crept into the numbering process, then the
system would not work.  Id. at 282.
144 Id. at 285–87.
145 Id. at 286–87.
description of the relevant characteristics of each fastener.134  The numbers were
not selected and assigned arbitrarily as in Toro.  Rather, in the words of Toro, they
were used in a “meaningful pattern, . . . by which one could distinguish effort or
content.”135  Each fastener was identified by a unique nine-digit number, and each
digit of that number described a specific physical aspect of the fastener,136 and
these numbers were listed in Southco’s handbooks.137  Kanebridge, a distributor
of fasteners manufactured by one of Southco’s competitors, used the Southco
system in comparison charts that made clear to customers that their fasteners were
interchangeable with Southco’s and that Kanebridge’s products were less
expensive.138 
Southco did not claim protection for its system.139  Instead, to no avail, it
sought protection for the numbers themselves.140  The Third Circuit twice
concluded that the parts numbers were not copyrightable even though they were
generated by a thoughtfully created system that had become the industry standard.
The numbers still fell short of the minimal level of creativity required for
protection.141  Each number was “rigidly dictated by the rules of the Southco
system” so there was no creative thought in their assignment.142  In essence, they
were “mechanically produced by the inflexible rules of the Southco system.”143
In addition, the court also noted that the Register of Copyrights had routinely
determined that parts numbers were not copyrightable subject matter because they
were analogous to short phrases and titles of works, both of which had been
denied registration by the Copyright Office since 1899.  The government argued
in support of the Register’s position in an amicus brief,144 and the court concluded
that the longstanding practice of denying protection to short phrases was entitled
to deference and that it logically extended to parts numbers.145
Southco’s argument for protection was based on the suggestion in Toro that
numbering systems that used symbols in a meaningful pattern instead of at
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146 Southco I, 258 F.3d at 153. 
147 Id. at 153–54.
148 Southco III, 390 F.3d at 282–83 (citing and quoting WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 46 (2d ed. 2004)).
149 ATC Distribution Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005).  The underlying dispute was typical; a competitor based its catalogue on
plaintiff’s widely distributed catalogue, and plaintiff sued for infringement.  The competitor admitted
copying the numbering system but asserted the affirmative defense that the work is not eligible for
protection, and the court agreed, finding that the parts numbers lacked originality.  Id. at 703–05.
The court also held that plaintiff’s catalogue, illustrations, and manual lacked originality, and the
Court of Appeals agreed that none of the works copied by the defendant were protectable.  Id.
at 705.
150 Id. at 705.
151 Id. at 706.
152 Id. at 705–06.
153 Id. at 706.
random might be copyrightable.146  The Third Circuit rejected this reliance on Toro
because it invoked the discredited “sweat of the brow” theory and Toro stated only
that a system might be protectable, while the dispute in Southco was over the
originality of the numbers, not the system.147  Moreover, the court’s en banc
opinion quoted a leading treatise’s statement that “copyright protection should not
be extended to part numbers that represent ‘an inevitable sequence dictated by the
logic of the parts system.’ ”148
The copyrightability of parts numbers took another, perhaps fatal, blow in
ATC Distribution, in which the Sixth Circuit ruled that the organization and
numbering system in a transmission parts catalogue was unprotectable.149  ATC’s
catalogue sorted transmission parts into three basic categories:  brand, type of
transmission, and type of part.150  There were subcategories within each of these.
For instance, in the brand category transmissions were listed by manufacturer,
while under the type of parts section it was evident that ATC made certain
decisions, like whether to list rings generally or to divide the category between
sealing rings and O-rings.  Parts within the subcategories were numbered
sequentially, but the ordering of the subcategories appeared to be random, and the
fact that O-rings were numbered in the 300s and that two parts within the
grouping were numbered 311 and 312 instead of 341 and 342 seemed to be
accidental.151  ATC argued that its catalogue was a classification scheme or
taxonomy that evidenced creativity so the individual parts numbers were protected
as copyrightable expression in the overall taxonomy.152  It also said that the
catalogue as a whole was a copyrightable compilation.153 
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that classification schemes may be creative
enough to be copyrightable but stated that all of the creative aspects of ATC’s
classification scheme were unprotectable ideas.  ATC could not protect its
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154 Id. at 707.  The trial court said that permitting copyright protection for ATC’s choice of where
in the catalogue to locate a new part would be like granting protection for a grocer’s choice about
whether to display a new heirloom tomato with gourmet produce, tomatoes generally, or locally
grown produce.  See id. at 707 n.4.
155 Id. at 707.
156 Id. at 709.
157 Id. The court added that there were sound reasons, other than originality, for denying
protection to short “works” like parts numbers and, like the Third Circuit in Southco, it noted the
Copyright Office’s policy against registering short phrases.  Id. at 709–10.
158 Id. at 711–12.
159 Id.  The court also concluded that the plaintiff’s illustrations of parts were intended to be as
accurate as possible and fell short of the “substantial variation” required for protection; plus, the
arrangement of the drawings, depicting transmission assembly or disassembly, were not original.
Id. at 712.
prediction of how many rings might be developed or its judgment that a new part
belonged in a particular subcategory.154  Also, copyright protection for ATC’s
expression of its ideas about parts classifications was barred, in part, by the merger
doctrine.  The court stated:
For example, the only way to express the prediction that a maximum
of four additional types of sealing rings might be developed is to
leave four numbers unallocated, and the only way to express the idea
that a novel part should be placed with the sealing rings rather than
with the gaskets is to place that part with the sealing rings.155 
Even assuming that some strings of numbers used to designate items could be
sufficiently creative to satisfy the originality standard, the court said that ATC’s
allocation of numbers to each subcategory and to each part was not protectable
because it was essentially a random process.156  The court elaborated by stating:
Were it not for a series of random orderings within each category
field, a given part could be 47165 or 89386.  As such, the particular
numbers allocated to each part do not express any of the creative
ideas that went into the classification scheme in any way that could
be considered eligible for copyright protection.157
The court also held that ATC’s catalogue was not protectable as a compilation
because the only difference between it and an earlier catalogue was the choice of
headings and arrangement of parts into categories; these choices were
insufficiently creative to justify protection.158  Even though ATC might have
arranged the information in other ways that were less useful, this fact did not
demonstrate creativity.159
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160 See, e.g., Decker, Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (involving
plaintiff’s business catalogues, which used color drawings, text describing the products, and
photographs—there was not a numbering system at issue).  The court distinguished ATC, holding
that plaintiff’s catalogue satisfied the originality requirement, and denied defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the trier of fact could find substantial similarity of protected
expression.  Id. at 742–43.
161 See SHUBHA GHOSH, RICHARD GRUNER, JAY KESAN & ROBERT REIS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 98 (2007).
162 Official Kelley Blue Book Site, http://www.kbb.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
163 See, e.g., CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999); CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean
Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).
It is difficult to think of any set of parts numbers or parts numbering system
that might be copyrightable after Toro, Southco, and ATC.  Numbers that are
chosen randomly or arbitrarily are not protectable because they lack creativity, and
any system that assigns parts numbers in some logical pattern is not protectable
because of the explicit limitations in section 102(b).  The creativity needed to
devise that system does not save it.  The merger doctrine also restricts protection
for parts numbers, and the Copyright Office treats them like unprotectable short
phrases and titles.  These generalizations about parts numbers and numbering
systems should not, however, be interpreted to mean that catalogues cannot be
protected by copyright.  To the contrary, many aspects of a catalogue might be
copyrightable, including illustrations, descriptions of products, and how those
illustrations and descriptions are presented.160
C. TASTE, OPINION, PREDICTIONS AND SOFT FACTS
Several decisions involving compilations of so-called “soft facts” stand in
contrast to the parts numbering cases.  There is a substantial market for
collectables like coins, stamps, dolls, and memorabilia as well as pre-owned goods
like houses, cars, boats, and motorcycles.  Buyers and sellers of these goods want
to know about values, prices, and demand so they can make informed purchases
and sales, and it is not surprising that there are entities that offer compendiums
and databases with this information.161  For instance, you can turn to the Kelley Blue
Book online or in hard copy to find the retail value of particular makes and models
of used cars and trucks.162  Are these listings of products with their costs and
prices copyrightable, or are they unprotectable like parts numbers in catalogues?
Several decisions have held that price guides like the Kelley Blue Book can meet
Feist’s originality standard when the act of setting the prices requires the exercise
of judgment by the author/compiler/valuator.163  The Kelley Blue Book value of
$14,000 for a 2004 Ford Ranger pickup truck with a V6 engine, relatively low
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mileage, and in good condition arguably is not the same kind of fact as my office
telephone number or the list price of a 2007 Ford Ranger at your local dealer.164
Feist states that in determining whether a compilation satisfies the originality
requirement the author’s “selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.”165  In contrast,
selections reflecting the compiler’s opinion or taste can be protected because they
are not inevitable or mechanical.166  The Second Circuit, having rejected the sweat
of the brow rationale for protection prior to Feist, has been applying this principle
consistently in a variety of contexts.167  For instance, in Eckes v. Card Prices Update,
the court held that a selection of 5,000 premium baseball cards out of a universe
of 18,000 was entitled to copyright protection.168  The exercise of judgment in
making these selections evidenced the requisite creativity.169  On the other hand,
in Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investor Service, Inc., the court held that the
listing of five items of information concerning municipal bond calls was not
sufficiently creative as a selection to warrant protection.170  The five items had all
appeared in “tombstone” advertisements and only “minor additional research”
was needed to complete the listings.171  In other words, the five categories were
standard in the industry, and including them on the bond calls did not evidence
any judgment on the part of the author.  There was not even a modest degree of
creativity in selecting those categories.
Kregos v. Associated Press172 was rendered shortly after the Supreme Court
announced its ruling in Feist.  At issue was a form that Kregos distributed to
newspapers displaying nine categories of baseball pitching statistics concerning the
past performances of the opposing pitchers scheduled to start each day’s baseball
games.173  Kregos compiled the form to help readers predict the outcome of
baseball games.  He did not weight the several statistics in his categories but left
the actual prediction, based on those specific statistics, to his baseball fan
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readers.174  The Associated Press (AP) published a virtually identical pitching form,
and Kregos sued for infringement.  He asserted no rights in each day’s data and
limited his claim to the appropriated form.175  The trial court ruled that the form
was not copyrightable,176 but the Second Circuit disagreed.177  It noted that the
plaintiff selected nine items of information concerning a pitcher’s performance
from a
universe of known facts only available from inspection of box
scores of prior games [that] is considerably greater than nine . . .
Kregos could have selected past performances from any number of
recent starts, instead of using the three most recent starts.  And he
could have chosen to include strikeouts, walks, balks, or hit
batters. . . .  In short, there are at least scores of available statistics
about pitching performance available to be calculated from the
underlying data and therefore thousands of combinations of data
that a selector can choose to include in a pitching form.178
The court then said that whether the selections showed sufficient creativity was
a close question.179  Kregos had done more than select the five standard facts
about bond calls that were routinely grouped together in tombstone ads,180 and
there were no prior pitching forms identical to his nor one from which his varied
only slightly.181  His copyright could not “be rejected as a matter of law for lack of
the requisite originality and creativity.”182 The selected categories reflected Kregos’
opinion about the most important statistics for predicting winners in baseball
while the actual prediction was left to readers. He was not monopolizing any
ideas.183 
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189 Id.  There was evidence that Red Book customers had canceled their subscriptions and
purchased CCC subscriptions.  Id.
190 Id.  The trial court also found that there was merger of idea and expression and that the Red
Book was in the public domain because it had been incorporated in government regulations.  Id.
191 Id. at 66.
192 Id. at 67.
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A leading post-Feist decision for the proposition that the originality standard
is satisfied where the author/compiler exercises subjective and evaluative
judgment to create soft facts is CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter
Market Reports, Inc.184  Maclean Hunter published the Red Book, which set forth the
editors’ projections of the values of used cars differentiated by make, model
number, body style, engine type, and region, with adjustments based on mileage
and options.185  The court noted that these values represented the editors’
predictions, based on a variety of sources and their professional judgment, of
expected values for the various makes and models.186  CCC also provided its
customers with information on used car values, and it utilized Maclean’s Red Book
by loading substantial portions of it onto its computer network and republishing
the information in various forms.187  CCC sought a declaratory judgment that it
was not infringing Maclean’s copyright by taking and republishing material.188
Maclean responded by alleging infringement, and there were cross motions for
summary judgment.189 
The trial court ruled for CCC, finding that there was no originality or creativity
in the selection, coordination, or arrangement of data, and that the valuations were
unprotectable facts or interpretations of facts.190  The Second Circuit disagreed.
After discussing Feist and many of the circuit’s decisions involving compilations,
it stated that the district court misapplied precedent and misinterpreted Feist as
erecting a high barrier of originality.191  It said that the Red Book values were not
discovered nor were they mechanical derivations of prices and data.  Rather, they
were based on professional judgment and expertise as well as on multiple data
sources.192  It made no difference that they were expressed in numerical form.193
The court also held that Maclean’s selection and arrangement displayed ample
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originality by dividing the national market for used cars into regions, adjusting
values for mileage in 5,000 mile increments, using the concept of the “average”
vehicle in each category, and selecting the number of years for which models
would be included.194 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that CCC’s strongest argument was that it
had taken nothing more than unprotected ideas due to application of the merger
doctrine.195  After an extended discussion of merger and its purpose as well as the
rationale for copyright protection, the court explained that there is a “dichotomy
between types of ideas,” in that the merger doctrine contemplates denying
protection to “building block ideas explaining processes or discoveries,” while
expressions of subjective opinion can be protected.196  The court explained:
In cases of wholesale takings of compilations, a selective application
of the merger doctrine, withholding its application as to soft ideas
infused with taste and opinion, will carry out the statutory policy to
protect innovative compilations without impairing the policy that
requires public access to ideas of a more important and useful
kind.197
Since CCC took virtually the entire Red Book compendium and since the copied
valuations were not building block ideas or facts but statements of opinion by the
editors that explained nothing and described no method, process, or procedure,
the Second Circuit directed entry of judgment in Maclean’s favor.198  CCC
remained free to place its own values on used cars by weighing the same data used
by Maclean, but it could not make a wholesale copy of what was original to
Maclean.199
The Ninth Circuit applied the Red Book decision in CDN, Inc. v. Kapes.200  CDN
published a weekly report of wholesale prices for collectible coins called the Coin
Dealer Newsletter.201  It included prices for virtually all collectible United States
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coins.202  Kenneth Kapes, a coin dealer, acknowledged using CDN’s wholesale
prices in setting up an internet website with retail prices for many coins.203  CDN
sued Kapes for infringement, and Kapes responded by arguing that the prices
themselves were unprotectable.204  The trial court held that the price lists were not
like the phone number listings in Feist; they were not facts but rather the product
of CDN’s creativity and judgment.205  The Ninth Circuit agreed:
CDN’s process to arrive at wholesale prices begins with examining
the major coin publications to find relevant retail price information.
CDN then reviews this data to retain only that information it
considers to be the most accurate and important.  Prices for each
grade of coin are determined with attention to whether the coin is
graded by a professional service (and which one).  CDN also
reviews the online networks for the bid and ask prices posted by
dealers.  It extrapolates from the reported prices to arrive at
estimates for prices for unreported coin types and grades.  CDN
also considers the impact of public auctions and private sales, and
analyzes the effect of the economy and foreign policies on the price
of coins. . . .  The prices CDN creates are compilations of data that
represent its best estimate of the value of the coins.206
If CDN had simply reported the prices paid by dealers throughout the country,
those prices would not have been copyrightable.207  But CDN did much more than
that; the prices it listed were the company’s best estimates of the fair value of
coins.208  The court cited and discussed with approval the Second Circuit’s
decision in Maclean Hunter,209 and rejected the defendant’s merger and estoppel
arguments:  “CDN does not, nor could it, claim protection for its idea of creating
a wholesale price guide, but it can use the copyright laws to protect its idea of what
those prices are.”210 
It is always difficult to draw the line between unprotected facts and ideas and
protected expression, and this line arguably becomes even more blurred when
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courts extend protection to “soft facts” like Maclean Hunter’s used car values or
CDN’s wholesale coin prices.211  Distinguishing what is a fact versus an opinion
versus a question of taste is not always easy.  Lurking in the background is the risk
of resurrecting the sweat of the brow doctrine and extending protection to facts,
contrary to the teachings of Feist.  These risks, however, are minimized due to the
merger doctrine,212 the rigorous standard for proving infringement of compilations
that requires by virtually wholesale appropriations of protected expression, and
sound application of the fair use defense.213
D. CLASSIFICATIONS AND TAXONOMIES
Works like almanacs, diaries, journals, calendars, and catalogues often have
categories for displaying and recording information.  A compiler’s decisions about
selecting categories, establishing classifications, organizing the categories, and
choosing the information to include in the categories can evidence creativity.  It
is not surprising that classification schemes (taxonomies) can be copyrightable,
assuming they are not routine, typical, standard, or run-of-the-mill ways of
organizing the relevant information. 
Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer Law Book Publishers214 is a pre-Feist decision
involving Chapter 59, Illustrative Awards & Settlements, in Volume 6 of Bender’s
nine volume Damages in Tort Actions and Kluwer’s single volume book, What’s It
Worth? A Guide to Personal Injury Awards and Settlements.215  There were many
similarities in formats, with both works organizing selected cases into virtually
identical subchapters according to the injured body part.216  The subchapters were
arranged alphabetically and divided identically as settlement or judgment, and as
adequate, inadequate and excessive settlements or judgments.217  Both works were
set up by state in alphabetical order and by amount, from large to small, and both
utilized six columns with almost identical headings.218  However, the actual case
descriptions were different.219
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Notwithstanding these similarities, Bender lost the case because its categories
and their organization were unprotectable.  The court stated that the idea of
compiling settlement and award data for personal injury cases is not copyrightable,
and that due to the merger and blank form doctrines, as well as the originality
requirement, Bender’s use of a practical chart with chapter and subchapter
headings was not copyrightable.220  The court noted that there were a limited
number of ways to organize the information in a useful manner and that the
various components of Bender’s chart were seen in other publications.221  They
were not original to Bender’s editors.  Terms like “amount” and “jurisdiction” and
their synonyms could not be protected, and the modicum of creativity requirement
was not satisfied.222 
The categories which Bender employed in its charts are the only
sensible ones which could have been used to compile the data
contained in Damages.  The use of nearly identical charts to compile
data on future cases would not constitute a copyright infringement
since the chart’s components by themselves are not copyrightable
in this case.223
The only suspect point in this pre-Feist decision is the court’s citation to an
earlier opinion in which the trial court said that compilations are copyrightable for
two reasons:  the labor expended in their preparation and the author’s use of
subjective judgment and selectivity.224  The labor or sweat of the brow rationale
for protection was, of course, discredited in Feist.225  As for judgment and
selectivity, there were only a few ways to organize personal injury awards and
settlement data in a logical and effective manner, and the categories and
subcategories used by the plaintiff were standard and obvious.  What Bender did
might have been doomed from the start because it was obvious or even inevitable.
American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n (American Dental II)226 is a post-
Feist decision that considered whether a taxonomy was copyrightable.  At issue
was the ADA’s Code of Dental Procedures and Nomenclature that classifies all dental
procedures in groups, assigns numbers to each procedure, and gives short and
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long descriptions of each procedure.227  Defendant Delta Dental published a work
that included most of the numbering system and short descriptions from the
ADA’s Code.228  Delta Dental argued that the Code was not copyrightable, and the
trial court agreed in a sweeping opinion that effectively held that a taxonomy that
comprehensively catalogues a field of knowledge cannot be selective in scope or
arrangement.229  The opinion also treated the Code like a useful article, said that it
was intended as a means to an end, and concluded that if the functional
components of the work were removed, the remaining creative component was
negligible.230
The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded.  Judge Easterbrook, writing for a
unanimous panel, pointed out that the breadth of the district court’s reasoning had
the effect of removing copyright protection from a wide variety of works routinely
regarded as copyrightable, such as West’s Key Numbering System, the Kelley
Bluebook, commercial software, blueprints, and maps.  He stated that taxonomies
may be copyrightable because “[c]lassification is a creative endeavor.  Butterflies
may be grouped by their color, or the shape of their wings, or their feeding or
breeding habits, or their habitats, or the attributes of their caterpillars, or the
sequence of their DNA; each scheme of classification could be expressed in
multiple ways.”231  The same was true for dental procedures, which could be
classified in a variety of ways.232  Moreover, the descriptions in the Code did not
merge with the facts.233  The court concluded that all three elements of the
Code—numbers, short descriptions, and long descriptions—were copyrightable
subject matter:  “Delta Dental Association could have written its own
classification of dental procedures.”234
The Seventh Circuit did not stop at this point.  It explained that the Code was
not a compilation under section 103 because it did not collect or compile bits and
pieces of independently existing elements.235  This statement was unnecessary and
arguably wrong by improperly narrowing what falls within the Copyright Act’s
definition of “compilation” as a work “formed by the collection and assembling
2007] THIN BUT NOT ANOREXIC 121
236 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
237 Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004).  Even though 121 of the
122 poems that Silverstein found in magazines and newspapers that had not been included in any
collection of Parker’s poems were included in defendant’s Penguin book, the court vacated summary
judgment for the compiler and remanded so the trial court could decided whether there was
sufficient creativity exercised by the compiler.  Id. at 78, 86.
238 American Dental II, 126 F.3d at 979.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 980.
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 981.
243 Id.; see also Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 928–29 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that plaintiff’s tables were copyrightable due to formatting choices that were not
unavoidable, and that defendant copied plaintiff’s tables when alternative options were available to
it).
244 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003).
of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship.”236  For instance, the Second Circuit treated the person who gathered
the uncollected poems of the late Dorothy Parker as a compiler and questioned
whether his selection satisfied the creativity requirement.237  If a collection of
poetry is a compilation, then so is the ADA’s Code.  It is the collection and
assembly of dental procedures.  These procedures were placed in classification
groups and assigned numbers.  The descriptions were drafted by a committee after
heated discussions.238  These descriptions could have been written in a variety of
ways.239 Putting all of this together makes a compilation. 
The Seventh Circuit also explained that the trial court had mistakenly applied
the Copyright Act’s limitations on the scope of protection for useful articles and
had improperly mixed two distinct issues:  originality and functionality.240  The
court reasoned that determining whether a literary work like the Code is original
should be relatively easy and not complicated by questions concerning limitations
the Copyright Act places on the protection of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works.241  Finally, the court concluded that copyright protection for the Code was
not precluded by section 102(b) because it was not a system that monopolized a
field of practice.242  The ADA encouraged dentists, insurers, and others to use the
Code, but Delta Dental was not simply using it.  Rather, Delta Dental copied the
Code itself and then made and distributed a derivative work based on the Code.
That constituted infringement.243 
The Seventh Circuit held that a classification system was a copyrightable
compilation in Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc.244  In this
case, the plaintiff had developed a computer program called Market Drive.  The
program took real estate data, such as address, owner’s name, age of property,
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assessed valuation, and number of rooms in the property, and automatically
arranged the data into 456 fields grouped in thirty-four master categories such as
“Income Valuations” and “Residential Buildings.”245  Municipal tax officials could
use a number of queries to view this information.246  The court, through Judge
Posner, held that the
modest [originality] requirement is satisfied by Market Drive because
no other real estate assessment program arranges the data collected
by the assessor in these 456 fields grouped into these 34 categories,
and because this structure is not so obvious or inevitable as to lack
the minimal originality required, [citing Key Publications] as it would
if the compilation program simply listed data in alphabetical or
numerical order.  [citing Feist] The obvious orderings, the lexical and
the numeric, have long been in the public domain, and what is in the
public domain cannot be appropriated by claiming copyright.247
Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that its program was copyrightable, the
plaintiff lost because it tried to use its copyright improperly to block defendant
Wiredata’s access to and use of uncopyrightable facts and data that had not been
created or obtained by the plaintiff.248  The plaintiff’s copyrightable classification
scheme for presenting the real estate data did not extend protection to the data
itself.249
BUC International Corp. v. International Yacht Council Ltd.250 is a recent Eleventh
Circuit decision upholding a jury verdict of copyright infringement on the
equivalent of a multiple listings service for yachts.  The plaintiff’s BUCNET listing
service was a centralized directory of yacht listings that enabled yacht brokers to
access industry information.251  It utilized a standard form and format that brokers
used to submit information about vessels.252  The plaintiff selected and arranged
the format’s section headings that appeared on the computer screen, and these
headings included categories like accommodations and layout, overview, vessel
walkthrough, galley/laundry, electronics and navigation, hull, construction, sails
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and rigging, and several other classifications.253  The defendants set up a
competing computerized listing service that replicated 4,400 listings from
BUCNET,254 and plaintiff sued for infringement.  The case went to trial; the trial
court denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, and the jury
returned a verdict for BUC with an award of damages.255
On appeal the defendants argued that BUC’s compilation lacked originality as
a matter of law because (1) the brokers were the real authors of the selection and
arrangement, (2) the merger doctrine precluded protection for the selection of
section headings, and (3) the plaintiff’s selection and arrangement lacked the
requisite level of creativity.256  The Eleventh Circuit said that the first contention
lacked merit because in only 2% of the plaintiff’s 4,667 listings had the brokers
modified the BUCNET format, and this did not render them authors of the
compilation.257  In regard to merger, the court concluded that the defendants
defined the idea too narrowly, that the general idea was how to present
information about boats to brokers, and that there were many ways to select and
organize all the information in a yacht listing.258  Defendants could use standard
terms like “hull” and “galley,” but not in the same manner as BUC.259  As for
creativity, the court reviewed the testimony from the trial regarding how the
categories were selected and structured and concluded that there was no error in
the district court’s denial of defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of
law.260
The defendants also argued that they should be afforded a new trial because
the jury was instructed that it could find infringement if there were “substantial
similarities” between the original elements of BUC’s compilation and the
corresponding elements of defendants’ compilation.261  Instead, defendants
asserted that the jury should have been instructed that the works needed to be
“virtually identical.”262  The court of appeals found no error in the trial court’s
instructions and said the substantial similarity standard applied for the
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1997); supra notes 226–43 and accompanying text.
270 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
271 Id. at 570.
272 Id. at 573; see also Durham, supra note 9, at 845–46 (noting that the court found the game and
the book to be lacking in substantial similarity).
infringement of factual compilations.263  It acknowledged that “it is the original
selection and arrangement of the collected data that bear legal significance for
factual compilations.”264  The court concluded, after analyzing BUC’s work, that
the listing service presented the jury with substantial claims for infringement of the
selection, order, and arrangement of the compilation, in particular the categories
and section headings.265  There was no error in the instruction.266 
Most taxonomies will satisfy the creativity requirement of the originality
standard unless the compiler’s categories or classifications are standard,
commonplace, or obvious, like the presentations of personal injury awards and
settlements in the Bender case.267  Similarly, it is difficult to support protection for
the alphabetically arranged categories and subcategories in a standard yellow pages
directory because they are routine and commonplace.268  Still, the classifying
information will ordinarily be a creative exercise by the compiler as Judge
Easterbrook noted in American Dental II.269  Of course, the compiler’s copyright
protection does not extend to the facts or the data he or she has classified.  This
is shown vividly by Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co.,270 in which the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the creators of the Trivial Pursuit game did not infringe Worth’s
copyright in his two volume trivia encyclopedia even though the game creators
drew on those books for many of their questions and answers.  Worth’s trivia
came from books, films, television, and other sources, and the 6,000 items in each
volume were arranged alphabetically by subject matter headings.271   He exercised
significant creativity in selecting and organizing all the interesting facts but lost
because there was not substantial similarity of protected expression; Trivial
Pursuit’s arrangement was much different, plus the entire selection of facts in the
game and the plaintiff’s books was different.272
2007] THIN BUT NOT ANOREXIC 125
273 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991).
274 See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
as copyrightable compilation of blank forms but not individual forms); Brown Instrument v.
Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (holding as not copyrightable graphic temperature/pressure
charts designed to record); Taylor Instrument v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943)
(holding as not copyrightable blank form for recording temperatures).
275 Victor Lalli, 936 F.2d at 672; see also Abrams, supra note 12, at 28–29.
276 Victor Lalli, 936 F.2d at 673.
277 Id. at 673–74.
278 Id. at 673.  The trial court ruled before Feist was decided and relied on Second Circuit
decisions that were cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Feist.  Id. at 673–74.
279 The Copyright Office has a regulation against copyright of blank forms “which are designed
for recording information and do not in themselves convey information.”  37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2006).
280 889 F.2d 197, 204–05 (9th Cir. 1989).
281 Id. at 208.
E. CHARTS, FORMS AND JUDICIAL REPORTS
Simple charts or formats for recording information rarely will be protectable
based on the post-Feist decision in Victor Lalli Enterprises v. Big Red Apple, Inc.273 as
well as the old rule that blank forms for simply recording information are not
copyrightable.274 The Victor Lalli litigation was about a collection of numbers
drawn from available horse racing statistics that were used in betting on illegal
numbers games.  The numbers were recorded in charts with identical formats
showing the months of the year in a row on top and the numbers one to thirty-
one in a vertical column for the days of the month.275  Defendant Big Red directly
photocopied Lalli’s chart.276  The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision
that the chart was not copyrightable because the functional grids offered no
opportunity for variations in arranging the statistics.277  The format was
conventional, and the plaintiff did not exercise selectivity in what was reported or
creativity in how the statistics were reported.278 
Even if the format or chart for recording information is more complex than
what was at issue in Victor Lalli, the venerable blank forms doctrine279 may limit
or even preclude protection.  For instance, the Ninth Circuit held in Harper House,
Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc. that the plaintiff’s organizer was copyrightable as a
compilation when considered as a whole based on Harper House’s selection,
coordination, and arrangement of the various elements, but that it merited only
“extremely limited” protection because so much of it consisted of blank forms and
common property.280  The case was, however, remanded because the jury was not
told that blank forms and common property are unprotectable so that their
finding of infringement might have been based on copying of such unprotectable
material instead of copying of the plaintiff’s selection, coordination or
arrangement.281
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282 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 244–45.
283 West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986).
284 Id. at 1226–27.
285 Id. at 1227. 
286 See Abrams, supra note 12, at 33–34; L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law:  The
Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 722 (1989).
287 Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co. (West I), 158 F.3d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1998);
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co. (West II), 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998) .  West’s syllabi,
headnotes, and key numbers were not at issue.  Defendant/declaratory-judgment plaintiff Hyperlaw
did not propose to copy those aspects of the case reports.  Id. at 677–78; see also JOYCE ET AL., supra
note 6, at 246–47.
288 West I, 158 F.3d at 681.  West had also asserted some creativity in its corrections to the text
of opinions but dropped this claim, perhaps due to the triviality of punctuation and spelling changes.
See id. at 681 n.4.
289 Id. at 689.
It is well accepted that while judicial cases are not subject to copyright
protection, the headnotes, case summaries, and other materials added by
publishers are protectable.282  What else might be protected in a volume of cases
assembled, edited, and arranged by a publisher like West?  Prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Feist, West was successful in protecting its “star pagination”
page breaks in litigation against the “jump cites” used by Lexis.283  The Eighth
Circuit upheld an injunction and noted that West’s arrangement was the result of
labor, talent, and judgment that easily met the modicum of intellectual labor
standard.284  The proposed use of West’s page numbers would infringe.285  The
parties ultimately settled, but the reported decision was controversial.286
Several years after Feist the Second Circuit held, in contrast to the Eighth
Circuit, that several aspects of West’s case reports were not copyrightable.287  In
one of the companion declaratory judgment actions brought against it, West
claimed protection for
(i) the arrangement of information specifying the parties, court,
and date of decision; 
(ii) the selection and arrangement of the attorney information;
(iii) the arrangement of information relating to subsequent
procedural developments such as amendments and denials of
rehearing; and 
(iv) the selection of parallel and alternative citations.288
The Second Circuit analyzed these claims and concluded that the trial court
had not erred in holding that these elements of the reports were not
copyrightable.289  In regard to the captions, courts, and date information, West
claimed originality in its decisions to reference a case by the names of the first
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plaintiff and first defendant, to shorten long case names, to include the dates of
argument, and to capitalize the first named plaintiff and defendant.  The court said
that these changes were insubstantial, unoriginal, and uncreative, reflecting garden-
variety decisions of elementary importance.290  West’s decision to include
information about the attorneys lacked the requisite modicum of creativity because
the practice was typical and garden-variety.  Moreover, the options available to
publishers were quite limited.291  Similarly, in regard to West’s inclusion of
information about the subsequent procedural developments, such as denials of
rehearing, the court stated:
Given the few practical options available to West, and the fact that
the choice among these narrow options will be dictated by the
timing and nature of the court’s action, we do not think the district
court clearly erred in determining that this element of West’s case
reports does not demonstrate sufficient creativity to be
protectable.292
The closest question was West’s determination of which parallel citations to
include, but again the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that “almost
every one of West’s decisions relating to citation alterations is inevitable, typical,
dictated by legal convention, or at best binary.”293  The court stated:
One way of saying that West’s “choices” are obvious and typical is
that a competitor would have difficulty creating a useful case report
without using many of the same citations.  Affording these decisions
copyright protection could give West an effective monopoly over
the commercial publication of case reports (at least those containing
supplemental citations).294
West argued that the decisions in Kregos, Eckes, Key Publications, and CCC
Information Services established that only a low level of creativity was necessary in
order to protect works involving selection among facts.295  The court responded
that these cases “involved the exercise of judgments more evaluative and creative
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297 Id. at 690 (Sweet, J., dissenting).
298 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986).
299 Id. at 692.
300 Id. at 692–93 (citation omitted); see also VerSteeg, supra note 11, at 857–61 (discussing the pre-
Feist decision West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) and noting
that West’s arguments about its selection and arrangement of cases might satisfy the originality
standard as defined by Feist, but still indicating that the ruling in West’s favor might not have been
correct).
301 West II, 158 F.3d 693, 695 (2d Cir. 1998).
302 Id. at 707–08.
than West exercises in the four elements of the case reports that HyperLaw
intends to copy.”296
A vigorous dissent by Judge Sweet argued that the majority had imposed a
“standard that demands significantly more than the ‘modicum’ of creativity
required by Feist.”297  He said that the outcome was not consistent with the Second
Circuit’s decision in Key Publications, and that unlike the selections and
arrangements that were denied protection in Victor Lalli and Financial Information
Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.,298 because the choices were inevitable, all of
West’s basic choices involved subjective judgment.299  He concluded:
To the extent that the West selection of factual annotation may
seem obvious to anyone familiar with legal sources, it may be
because of West’s success in the market.  There is no support for
the proposition that West’s success in achieving an ‘industry
standard’ citation arrangement obligates them to donate the material
to the public domain.300
The companion case focused once again on West’s rights, if any, in “star
pagination.”301  The Second Circuit did not follow the Eighth Circuit’s pre-Feist
ruling in the Mead Data/Lexis suit, stating that the outcome was based on the
discredited sweat of the brow rationale for protection, and found no basis for
concluding that page numbers were a protected aspect of West’s arrangement.302
The Second Circuit stated:
At issue here are references to West’s volume and page numbers
distributed through the text of plaintiffs’ versions of judicial
opinions.  West concedes that the pagination of its volumes—i.e.,
the insertion of page breaks and the assignment of page
numbers—is determined by an automatic computer program, and
West does not seriously claim that there is anything original or
creative in that process.  As Judge Martin noted, “where and on
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what particular pages the text of a court opinion appears does not
embody any original creation of the compiler.”  Because the internal
pagination of West’s case reporters does not entail even a modicum
of creativity, the volume and page numbers are not original
components of West’s compilations and are not themselves
protected by West’s compilation copyright.303
Judge Sweet also dissented in this case.  He stated that “[b]y characterizing star
pagination as a fact, rather than as an essential part of the selection or arrangement
the majority deprives the West pagination of its originality and consequent
copyright protection.”304  Continuing, Judge Sweet argued:
Here the pagination results from West’s arrangements, selections,
syllabi, headnotes, key numbering, citations and descriptions.  The
page number, arbitrarily determined, is the sole result of the West
system, appears nowhere else, and is essential to its coordinated
method of citation.  It is, so to speak, an original fact resulting from
West’s creativity.”305
These arguments for protection of West’s page numbers sound, in many
respects, like the arguments against the protection of parts numbers and parts
numbering systems.  The page numbers are determined arbitrarily (this was fatal
in Toro) and are the result of a system (barred by section 102(b) as in Southco).306
Judge Sweet is troubled, of course, that by treating the page numbers as facts
instead of as protected expression permits Bender and Hyperlaw to “appropriate
the practical and commercial value of the West compilation,”307 but he forgets that
this is very much a part of the copyright balance. 
To paraphrase a portion of Justice Brennan’s dissent in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, it is understandable that Judge Sweet wants to
compensate West for the subsequent use of the page numbers.308  Justice Brennan
stated:
An inequity seems to lurk in the idea that much of the fruit of the
[compiler’s] labor may be used without compensation.  This,
however, is not some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme
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intended primarily to ensure a return for works of the imagination.
Congress made the affirmative choice that the copyright laws should
apply in this way:  “Copyright does not preclude others from using
the ideas or information revealed by the author’s work.  It pertains
to the literary . . . form in which the author expressed intellectual
concepts.”309
The Second Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit, has been rigorous in its
application of Feist’s principles in a variety of contexts.  The unwillingness of these
courts to protect facts and information notwithstanding apparent “free-riding” by
the defendant supports the basic principles announced in Feist. Protection for
compilations is thin because facts are not protected notwithstanding the labor and
efforts of the compiler.  There must be a modest amount of creativity in the
selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts and information.310 
IV.  SYNTHESIS
A. COPYRIGHTABILITY
 There is no bright line test for determining originality because of the nature
of the creativity requirement, but the courts have applied Feist with a reasonable
degree of consistency since 1991.311  The decisions teach several lessons. 
It is relatively safe to conclude that a comprehensive compilation that includes
all the facts, data, or information from a defined class will rarely exhibit sufficient
creativity in selection.  The compiler exercises no intellectual judgment in deciding
what to include in such a work.  A telephone directory’s alphabetical listing of the
names and numbers of everyone in a community is an example,312 as is the
comprehensive listing of cable system operators in the Warren case.313  On the
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other hand, a comprehensive listing of information might be placed in categories
and presented in a manner that evidences sufficient creativity.  An example is the
code of dental procedures at issue in American Dental II.314 
Selections that evidence the author’s or compiler’s exercise of judgment or
taste might evidence sufficient creativity, as shown by the premium baseball cards
at issue in Eckes or the estimates of used car values in Maclean Hunter.315  Selections
dictated by industry standards, custom, external forces, or government
requirements might not satisfy the creativity requirement.316 
Selections made by someone other than the compiler/author, such as the
decisions by subscribers to the yellow pages or purchasers of the advertisement
space about where to place their entries, are not creative.317  Taxonomies and
classification schemes usually are copyrightable if they are not obvious or standard
like the categories or classifications in the yellow pages.318  Arbitrarily or randomly
generated parts numbers for catalogues do not evidence authorship,319 and parts
numbers generated by applying a formula or following a system cannot be
protected because of the prohibition in section 102(b) on extending copyright
protection to ideas, concepts, and systems.320  Parts numbers also do not fare well
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because of the merger doctrine and the settled practice of the Copyright Office
denying protection to words, titles and short phrases.321
B. PROVING INFRINGEMENT
Even if a low authorship work satisfies the originality standard, the copyright
owner must still prove substantial similarity of protected expression in order to
prevail.  One court said that this requires that the plaintiff compiler show that
there are no more than trivial differences between those elements that provide
copyrightability to its work and to the allegedly infringing work.322  This means
that while the works need not be identical, there must be sufficient congruence
between the original elements of the works such that a jury could find
infringement.  The substantial similarity test varies to some extent on the nature
of the works at issue, and this makes the factual-compilation plaintiff’s case
difficult.323  Feist makes clear that it is the original selection, coordination, and
arrangement of the collected data that have legal significance for compilations.324
The Ninth Circuit has stated that “copyright infringement of compilations
consisting largely of uncopyrightable elements should not be found in the absence
of ‘bodily appropriation of expression.’ ”325  What this ordinarily means is that the
plaintiff will have to show something close to wholesale appropriation as in CCC
v. Maclean Hunter and CDN v. Kapes326 or BUC v. International Yacht.327  Copyright
protection for compilations is thin, and the protected aspects of these works will
be found in the author’s selection, coordination, or arrangement of the facts, data,
or information.  For instance, a compilation of blank forms in an executive
organizer might be copyrightable when viewed as a whole, even though the
individual blank forms are not protectable.328 
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In the context of computer software infringement litigation, some courts have
stated that when the range of protected expression is limited, the appropriate
standard for illicit copying is virtual identity or even “virtual identicality.”329  Does
this test apply to compilation litigation generally?  A leading treatise states:
[T]he measure of how substantial a “substantial similarity” must be
may vary according to the circumstances.  For many copyrights
represent significant creative effort, and are therefore reasonably
robust, whereas others reflect only scant creativity; the Supreme
Court labels the latter “thin.”  It would seem to follow analytically
that more similarity is required when less protectible matter is at
issue.  Thus, if substantial similarity is the normal measure required
to demonstrate infringement, “supersubstantial” similarity must pertain
when dealing with “thin” works.330
This arguably calls for a more demanding showing than the traditional
“substantial similarity” of protected expression test, confuses the issue of
copyrightability with infringement, and misleads courts.331  The Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in BUC International332 rejected the defendants’ plea for a “virtual
identicality” instruction.  The court stated that this test was for claims of
compilation copyright infringement of nonliteral elements of a computer program
and upheld a jury’s finding of infringement after being instructed about substantial
similarity.333  Perhaps the best way to explain this disagreement is to say that the
substantial similarity of protected expression test is the standard for infringement,
and as applied to low authorship works or works with thin copyrights, it is
sometimes necessary for the works to be virtually identical in order for the
plaintiff to win.
Moreover, the merger doctrine looms large against proving infringement in low
authorship cases.  A trial court explained that as idea and expression merge:  “a
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336 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
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337 In some cases involving a compilation it might be reasonable for a court to rule no
infringement notwithstanding some taking of a compilation’s protected expression if the taking is
slight or de minimis.  Cf. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559
(6th Cir. 1994) (the Sixth Circuit found fair use but could have said no infringement because what
the defendant copied—the NRA’s mailing list of Ohio’s legislators with asterisks by those serving
copyright holder must then prove substantial similarity to those few aspects of the
work that are expression not required by the idea.”334  This court continued:
It further follows that “the fewer the methods of expressing an idea,
the more the allegedly infringing work must resemble the
copyrighted work in order to establish substantial similarity.”  “In
such a case, the burden of proof is heavy on the plaintiff who may
have to show ‘near identity’ between the works at issue.”335
C. FAIR USE
Fair use336 will often be a strong defense for an alleged infringer if there is
more than a de minimis taking of protected expression from a low authorship
work.337  The sound application of fair use in the context of compilation litigation
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is illustrated by Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Systems International, Inc.338  This
case involved a claim of copyright infringement of Gulfstream’s maintenance
manuals for its corporate aircraft.  These complex and detailed manuals were
written for each of Gulfstream’s models in accordance with Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulations.  These manuals were required so that
maintenance mandated by the FAA was performed on schedule.  The manuals
were organized in keeping with an industry standard, and Gulfstream itself
performed the required maintenance for many, but by no means all, of its
aircraft.339  Defendant Camp was also in the business of performing scheduled
maintenance on all makes and models of corporate aircraft, and it reproduced
portions of Gulfstream’s manual in connection with its computerized maintenance
tracking service.  This service informed subscribers when work had to be
performed and specified the exact maintenance tasks.340  Gulfstream alleged that
this reproduction of portions of its manuals was copyright infringement.341  Camp
defended by saying that the copyrights on Gulfstream’s manuals were invalid and
that even if aspects of the manuals satisfied the originality standard, its use of the
manuals was a fair use.342
The court stated:
[F]ederal regulations mandate that “[t]he Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness must be in the form of a manual or manuals as
appropriate for the quantity of data to be provided,” and that “[t]he
format of the manual or manuals must provide for a practical
arrangement.”  Thus, not only is the content of the manuals specified
by regulation, but also the format of the manuals is specified so that
an aircraft manufacturer may not add unnecessary sections to give
the manuals a “creative” or “original” touch.
From the facts presented by Camp, then, and from the facts
judicially noticed by the Court—that is, that Gulfstream seeks to
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343 Id. at 1375–76 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
344 Id. at 1376.  The defendant in the BellSouth yellow pages litigation also conceded copyright on
the work as a whole.  See supra notes 81–99 and accompanying text.
345 Gulfstream, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.
346 Id.
347 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
348 Gulfstream, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 1378 (citations omitted).
349 Id. at 1379–80.
350 Id. at 1380; see also Assessment Tech. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.
2003); supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text.
351 The factual nature of the work also was discussed in regard to the third fair use factor: 
Camp does not copy or use all of Gulfstream’s manuals. . . .  Camp does not
load the entire soft copy of the manual onto its own system; it merely “extracts”
the specific pages that describe the maintenance tasks to be performed.
Thus, while Camp does not use the entire manuals—and, for that matter,
might not use any copyrighted portions of the manuals—it still admittedly uses
a significant amount of Gulfstream’s work, from both a quantitative and
qualitative standpoint.
Gulfstream, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 1378 (citation omitted).
copyright here maintenance manuals written in accordance with
federal guidelines that significantly prescribe the content and format
of those manuals—it is clear that much, if not all, of Gulfstream’s
manuals are not copyrightable in light of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).343
Nevertheless, Camp conceded that there was a thin copyright for Gulfstream’s
manuals344 and that it had copied pages that contained some copyrightable
expression.345  The court then proceeded to a thorough fair use analysis and
concluded that there was no infringement.346  In regard to the second fair use
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,347 the court explained:
Under the second fair use factor, the nature of Gulfstream’s work
is predominantly factual rather than creative.  As the Court has
already noted, the manuals contains mostly procedures, lists of
systems, and detailed methods of operations.  This factor points in
favor of finding that Camp has made a fair use of the manuals.348
In addition, there was no evidence that Camp’s use of the manuals affected the
market for the original copyrighted work.349  Moreover, the court explained that
Gulfstream’s real desire for copyright protection on the manuals was to gain a
judicially enforced monopoly in maintenance-tracking services for its aircraft and
that this was contrary to the purpose of copyright law.350  Accordingly, the court
found fair use even though its analysis of the first and third factors weighed
against Camp.351
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note 14 (critical of Maclean Hunter and Kaper); Durham, supra note 9, at 795, 822–37 (discussing
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355 It can be argued, however, that the decisions to divide the nation into regions and to limit the
car values to the last seven years were not especially creative because it is understood that car values
vary by region and because the market for older cars (seven years or so) is unpredictable given
factors like mileage, wear and tear, maintenance, and the like.  Moreover, Maclean Hunter did not
exercise any judgment in selection because it included all makes and models in the Red Book for the
particular years in question.
356 See supra notes 184–99 and accompanying text.
It is important to note that fair use is an affirmative defense that comes into
play only after the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of infringement.352  It is a
well-established doctrine, and the decisions applying this equitable rule of reason
are legion.  The drafters of section 107 explained that “the endless variety of
situations and combinations of circumstances” presented in copyright litigation
“precludes the formulation of exact rules” and that “courts must be free to adapt
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”353  Accordingly, in the
event a compiler plaintiff makes the difficult prima facie case that the defendant
copied protected expression from his or her thinly protected work, the defendant
should raise fair use like Camp Systems in the Gulfstream instruction manual
litigation.
D. UNPROTECTED SOFT FACTS
Can the cases involving soft facts be used to push Feist’s principles about
creativity and infringement out of shape to extend protection to facts?354  For
example, the copyrightability of used car values published in Maclean Hunter’s Red
Book was upheld because the editors exercised considerable creativity in setting the
values of cars manufactured in a certain range of years and breaking up these
values by region.355  The values for the particular makes and models were not
based solely on historical prices or a formula but on a variety of factors and the
judgment of the company’s editors/writers.  Those values were thus regarded as
soft facts and entitled to protection against the defendant’s wholesale
appropriation.356
Is a soft fact always a soft fact?  Would this be true to the spirit of Feist?  The
wholesale reproduction of the Red Book by CCC infringed, but would a Toyota
dealer in Athens, Georgia, infringe Maclean Hunter’s copyright if it took
information from the most recent edition of the Red Book about the resale value
of Toyotas and included those figures in an advertisement promoting how well
Toyotas hold their value?  What if the Toyota dealer included Red Book data about
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357 See supra notes 69–80 and accompanying text.  In addition, a court might rule that this is a de
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Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (defendant’s use held as not de minimis).
358 See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1994);
Consumers Union of the U.S. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983); Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Sys. Int’l, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (S.D. Ga. 2006). 
359 Consumers Union of the U.S. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983).
360 Id. at 1046. 
361 Id. at 1047 (quoting Lightweight Vacuum Cleaners, CONSUMER REPORTS, July 1983).
362 Id.
363 Id. at 1046–47.  State law claims were also asserted. Consumers Union was not satisfied with
General Signal’s disclaimer stating that it was not affiliated with Consumer Reports.  Id. at 1048.
364 Id. at 1047.
other makes and models in a comparative advertisement showing that Toyotas
hold their value better than those other makes and models?  The dealer has not
copied any of MacLean’s coordination or arrangement, but it has copied some of
Maclean’s soft facts and used them factually and accurately.  Are Maclean’s
protected soft facts turned into unprotectable hard facts in these hypothetical ads?
If not, is this use a fair use?
Based on the decisions that have upheld the copyrightability of low authorship
works and then moved to the issue of infringement, it is doubtful that this
hypothetical Toyota dealer would be liable.  A court could reasonably conclude,
as in Key Publications, that there is no substantial similarity of protected
expression.357  Moreover, this use of the protected “soft facts” from Maclean
Hunter’s low authorship Red Book would in all likelihood be a ruled a fair use
under section 107.358
This hypothetical is similar to the General Signal case.359  The plaintiff there
published Consumer Reports, and an article its July 1983 issue reported an
evaluation of lightweight vacuum cleaners.  Defendant General Signal’s Regina
Powerteam model received a check rating and considerable praise because it tested
“to be of high overall quality, low price, and appreciable superiority to the non-
check rated models examined.”360  The article also said the Powerteam was “ahead
of the pack in cleaning ability,” the only model that was “an adequate substitute
for a full-sized vacuum,” and the only one to have “ ‘vacuumed the floor
thoroughly.’ ”361  After this article was published, General Signal broadcast two
thirty-second television commercials that quoted these favorable statements from
the article.362  Consumers Union, which does not accept advertising or permit its
ratings and reports to be used in advertising, sued General Signal alleging
copyright infringement and other claims.363 
General Signal did not challenge the copyright on the article.  However, it
argued that it was a “fact” that Consumer Reports check-rated the Powerteam and
praised it as superior to other models.364  Moreover, General Signal quoted the
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article accurately, stating in the advertisements exactly what Consumer Reports
had written about the product.365  Under CCC v. Maclean Hunter, these evaluative
statements about the Powerteam would seem to be protectable soft facts,
reflecting the good judgment and sound opinion of Consumer Reports after
thorough testing.  However, that is not how the Second Circuit treated these test
results in holding that General Signal’s use of the article was a fair use:
Facts cannot be copyrighted.  CU cannot prevent Regina from
accurately reporting facts about the results of CU’s independent
testing, irrespective of Regina’s motive in doing so.  Regina wants to
communicate Consumer Reports’ favorable rating of its product.
Regina uses CU’s words in the interest of accuracy, not piracy.
Where an evaluation or description is being made, copying the exact
words may be the only valid way precisely to report the
evaluation.366
The court also emphasized that although the television advertisements
advanced General Signal’s commercial interests, they also reported factual
information, which is conducive to fair use.367  Moreover, the advertisements
borrowed only twenty-nine words out of the 2,100-word article, and there was no
evidence that it had a deleterious effect on the market for or value of Consumer
Reports.368
Although the Consumer Reports litigation did not involve alleged infringement
of a compilation, there are significant parallels between what General Signal did
and the hypothetical Toyota dealer’s advertisements using soft facts from Red
Book.  The dealer is using only a few soft facts out of thousands; it is using them
accurately, and Red Book should not be able to use its copyright to prevent Toyota
from reporting the “facts” of Red Book’s independent valuation of various makes
and models.  Moreover, it is doubtful that the dealer’s advertisements would have
any negative impact on the market for or value of the Red Book.  In short, even if
a court concluded that the Toyota dealer copied more than a de minimis amount
of protected expression,369 it would still hold that this small amount of copying
was a fair use under section 107. 
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376 See Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 211–12 (discussing the disciplinary effect of precedent and
appellate review).
377 Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
V.  CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court stated in Feist that “the vast majority of compilations will
pass [the modicum of creativity] test, but not all will.  There remains a narrow
category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to
be virtually nonexistent.”370  The Court’s prediction was correct. Most
compilations have been unaffected by the elusive “creativity” requirement.371
There were concerns expressed after Feist that the Court had failed to define the
originality requirement with sufficient clarity.372  Concerns have also been raised
about the creativity requirement being satisfied too easily with compilations of soft
facts, predictions, and opinion.373  However, the post-Feist cases show that the
courts do not have a blurred vision of what originality means in regard to
compilations and other low authorship works. 
There is no need to develop an alternative test of originality such as a
heightened standard or the “more than a trivial variation” standard often used to
assess the copyrightability of derivative works.  There is ample guidance from
Justice O’Connor’s opinion and subsequent cases applying Feist to enable courts
to determine whether otherwise original works satisfy the modicum of creativity
requirement.  Moreover, the difference between “more than a trivial variation”
and “at least a modicum of creativity” is largely semantic.  In addition, courts have
enough tools at their disposal to prevent the thin protection enjoyed by works like
the comprehensive price guides in Maclean Hunter and CDN v. Kapes or the
predictive list of baseball statistics in Kregos from being used improperly to extend
a copyright holder’s limited monopoly.
The originality standard remains low,374 so it does not take much more than a
penny to turn the copyright turnstile.375  The discipline imposed by Feist’s
principles, precedent, and rigorous appellate review has led to considerable
agreement about what kinds of works have sufficient creativity to warrant
protection.376  Protection remains thin,377 and establishing substantial similarity of
protected expression with low authorship works often requires proof of close to
wholesale copying.  Modest appropriations of protected aspects of compilations
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like soft facts often can be excused under fair use.  The courts have not permitted
compilers’ copyrights to be used improperly to block access to and use of
uncopyrightable facts and data.  The protection copyright grants to a compilation
may not be anorexic, but it certainly remains very lean.  After all, the essence of
copyright is that the fruits of a compiler’s labor may be used by others without
compensation.378
